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IMMATERIAL TO INNOVATION:
THE STORY OF ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS,

INC. V. ELI LILLY & CO.
INTRODUCTION
One of the crucial goals of the patent system is to promote
technological advancements.1 This is especially true in the biomedical
sciences field as new insights lead to advancements in diagnosis and
treatments.2 This goal of innovation is affected by the “scope” of patents,
and many theories have been put forth on the optimal scope.3
The written description requirement in federal patent law4 serves as one
possible check on patent scope. A hotly debated topic both in the Federal
Circuit5 and academia,6 this requirement faced its greatest challenge in
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a case involving a
biotechnology patent.7 After initially holding that the plaintiffs’ broad
claims were invalid because the written description inadequately supported
them,8 the Federal Circuit vacated the opinion and granted their petition for
rehearing en banc.9 Among the issues that the court wanted to address was
“[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written description

1. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 808 (1988).
2. See Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has Not Emerged in the
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 442 (2009).
3. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 985, 987 (2005).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention . . . .”). See also discussion infra Part II.B.
5. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J.,
concurring).
6. See Shengfeng Chen, Note, Pathways to Patents: Applying the Written Description
Requirement Doctrine to Patents on Biological Pathways, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 559,
562 (2008) (arguing that the written description doctrine can serve as an effective check against
broad patents on research tools); Wenrong Huang, Note, Enzo’s Written Description Requirement:
Can It Be An Effective Check Against Overly Broad Biotechnology Claims?, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that the loosened written description standard after Enzo does not
provide enough protection for broad patent claims and that the standard should be returned to the
way it was articulated in Eli Lilly); William C. Mull, Note, Using the Written Description
Requirement to Limit Broad Patent Scope, Allow Competition, and Encourage Innovation in
Biotechnology, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 393, 396 (2004) (arguing that the written description
requirement is being correctly applied by the Federal Circuit); Guang Ming Whitley, Note, A
Patent Doctrine without Bounds: The “Extended” Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617, 619 (2004) (asserting that the written restriction requirement gives too much
discretionary power to the judges); David A. Gay & Astrid R. Spain, Rochester Decision
Exacerbates the Written Description Threat to Biotechnology Inventors, I.P. LITIGATOR,
May/June 2005, at 6 (criticizing the written description requirement and its negative effect on
certainty involving the validity of patents).
7. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1369–71.
8. Id. at 1380.
9. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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requirement separate from an enablement requirement?”10 While the
rehearing could have eliminated the written description requirement, some
commentators’ fears over its possible demise11 have been assuaged because
the Federal Circuit decided to uphold it in its recent opinion.12 However,
other commentators’ might not be excited about this development,13
especially since it has been argued that the Court failed to provide much
guidance in its opinion.14
This note argues that, while some check on patent scope is necessary,
biotechnology companies and universities have effective resources and
measures in place to promote and enhance innovation, and to adapt to
change. Therefore, while Ariad might not have adequately clarified how the
written description requirement should be applied, the opinion will have
little effect on innovation. In the past, companies have developed strategies
in the face of exclusive patent rights that have allowed them to continue
their research.15 These strategies will continue to be successful in the future
if the companies accept that there is a separate written description
requirement and follow the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s
examining procedure regarding it. Additionally, the enablement
requirement on its own is an effective measure to limit the broadest patents
like Ariad’s, so upholding the written description requirement was not
necessary to promote innovation.
Part I of the note gives a brief overview of various theories on patent
scope and the effects of claim drafting on innovation. Part II provides a
background on the written description requirement, and compares it to the
enablement requirement. Part III uses this background to explore Ariad and
to demonstrate that the enablement requirement is an effective check on the
broadest patents. Lastly, Part IV analyzes the strategies utilized by
companies and universities that allow them to continue with their research
in the face of patents. These inspired maneuvers will prevent innovation
from being stymied even in light of the Federal Circuit’s continued reliance
on the written description requirement.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
See Huang, supra note 6; Chen, supra note 6.
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
See Gay & Spain, supra note 6; Whitley, supra note 6.
Howard Skaist, Guest Post: Ariad v. Lily: Choosing to Not Disrupt the Settled
Expectations of the Patent Community, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 28, 2010, 10:46 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/guest-post-ariad-v-lily-choosing-to-not-disrupt-thesettled-expectations-of-the-patent-community.html.
15. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 322, 324 (Wesley M. Cohen
& Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (arguing that companies and universities have the ability to
license, “invent around” patents, or ignore patents).
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I. SCOPE OF PATENTS AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON
INNOVATION—VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
POLICY
A primary concern with the written description requirement is its
possible effects on innovation.16 Since one of the purposes of the patent
system is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”17 and
patent scope in general has been connected with innovation,18 it is crucial to
analyze the effectiveness of this requirement while paying close attention to
its possible influence on how technology develops.19 The claims set out in a
patent application determine the scope of the invention and “distinguish the
inventor’s intellectual property from the surrounding terrain.”20 Legal
commentators have postulated many theories on the ideal scope for
patents21—particularly biotechnology patents, which have been in the
limelight of this debate because of the particular importance of biomedical
research to society.22 These theories are explored in detail below.
A. PROSPECT THEORY
Generally, “[p]rospect theory argues for broad patents because, by
granting control of a technology, they ensure efficient coordination of
innovation.”23 Edmund Kitch, who put forth this theory, relied on important
features of the patent system in the development of his argument.24 First,
patent claims are typically broader than what is described in the
specification.25 Second, inventors are typically able to apply for patents
“early in the development process.”26 This potentially allows inventions to
be patented before they are commercially viable.27 Since the inventor need
only disclose a device that works—and there are statutory bars in place that
reward promptness—she is incentivized to file as quickly as possible.28
While this process may seem counterintuitive, it arguably fulfills one of the
16. Mull, supra note 6, at 396 (stressing that the written description requirement enhances
innovation).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8; Merges, supra note 1, at 808.
18. See Adelman, supra note 3, at 987.
19. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990).
20. Id. at 844–45.
21. See Adelman, supra note 3, at 996.
22. David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007).
23. Adelman, supra note 3, at 996.
24. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
267 (1977).
25. Id. at 268.
26. Id. at 269.
27. Id. at 270.
28. Id. at 267, 269–70 (“[T]here are rules, such as the priority, time-bar, and patentability
rules, which force an early patent application whether or not something of value (and hence a
reward) has been found.”).
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vital roles of the patent system: to disclose what has been invented or
discovered “so others have the benefit of the inventor’s discovery.”29 Kitch
argued that these features allow the patent system to “increase the output
from resources used for technological innovation.”30 Believing that a lack of
competition was not a problem, and that “unification of control” was
important,31 Kitch appeared to prefer “single-firm domination of a
technological prospect.”32
B. MERGES AND NELSON’S APPROACH
Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson believed that
competition should play an important role in the patent system and
questioned the actual practical effects of unification of control.33 They
emphasized that giving one firm complete control of a given technology
would limit rivalry and result in diminished action in that technology’s
further development.34 Additionally, they argued that “overly broad rights
will preempt too many competitive development efforts.”35 However, they
also realized that keeping patent claims “too narrow will not provide
enough incentive to develop the asset.”36 Basing their argument on “faster is
better,” Merges and Nelson theorized that there is probably some
connection “between the speed with which innovations are introduced and
the overall number of innovations.”37 The process by which innovations are
created varies across industries, and licensing in some of these industries
could mitigate the negative effects of broad patents.38 For example, the
Cohen-Boyer patent, which covered a technique to insert a “gene into a host
cell,” was licensed broadly,39 preventing any inaction in that technology’s
development that might have resulted from only one firm having control
over the technology.40 Notwithstanding the mitigation potentials, Merges
and Nelson concluded that competition tends “to generate rapid progress
and seems a much better social bet than a regime where only one or a few
organizations control the development of any given technology.”41
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Merges, supra note 1, at 808.
Kitch, supra note 24, at 265.
Id. at 285.
Merges & Nelson, supra note 19, at 871–72.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 880, 883.
Id. at 906–07. A holder of a broad patent has the ability to prevent too many competitors
from entering the field. Id. at 875. Therefore, a patentee willing to allow others to develop and
improve the invention through licensing has the ability to substantially decrease the possible
negative effects the broad patent may have on innovation. Id. at 907.
40. Id. at 872.
41. Id. at 908.
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C. ANTICOMMONS AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
A criticism of the above competition model is that it ignores the
possibility of the formation of an “anticommons.”42 Michael Heller and
Rebecca Eisenberg worried that the patenting of biomedical research might
have the unwanted effects of underutilizing scarce resources and limiting
innovation.43 The concern is that if a plethora of patents was owned by too
many universities or companies, they would serve as obstacles to future
research instead of incentives to engage in risky but potentially rewarding
research.44 Heller and Eisenberg claimed there “has been a spiral of
overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners, reaching ever
further upstream in the course of biomedical research.”45 The development
of specific products might require access to various patents, which, if held
by too many competitors could increase transaction costs and unduly delay
innovation.46 A possible unfortunate result of this patent labyrinth is that
firms might decide to divert their resources to “less promising projects,” or
those less beneficial to society.47
However, a recent study looking at the biomedical research field
determined that an anticommons has not emerged.48 Since public entities
involved in promulgating discoveries largely control the “upstream”
research, and certain categories of patents have limited “usefulness,” the
“fenced in” research domain is much smaller than expected.49 The author
argued that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) leads this public sector
and engages in certain activities that prevent the formation of an
anticommons.50 This agency “mandat[es] liberal licensing of any funded
discoveries; foster[s] a critical mass of upstream innovators that private forprofit firms dare not sue; and launch[es] initiatives that pre-empt potential
anticommons-based business models, often by releasing discoveries and
information into the public domain.”51 An example of NIH trying to foster
innovation and prevent an anticommons from forming involves a method
that creates knockout mice.52 DuPont developed a method of creating these

42. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (“[A] resource is prone to
underuse in a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ when multiple owners each have a right to exclude
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.”).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 699.
47. Id.
48. Shiu, supra note 2, at 416.
49. Id. at 415–16.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 430. Knockout mice have had one or more of their genes modified to stop their
expression. Id.
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mice and licensed it for use in downstream research.53 However, these
licensing agreements contained “reach-through” provisions that appeared to
give DuPont ownership of downstream discoveries that depended on the
knockout mice.54 NIH “persuaded DuPont to remove the reach-through
provisions from its licensing agreement with all universities.”55
D. BURK AND LEMLEY’S TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC APPROACH
Realizing that patent law is applied differently across industries, Dan
Burk and Mark Lemley pointed out that the various theories on patent scope
might individually apply to one industry better than another.56 In
biotechnology, for example, there are “thousands of patents on DNA
sequences that cover specific genes or in some cases fragments of genes”
and research in gene therapy that requires the use of multiple patents, which
could lead to the formation of an anticommons.57 Additionally, the “reachthrough” licenses previously described have the potential to magnify the
problem by further fragmenting rights and preventing downstream
researchers from having complete control over their projects.58 However, in
the pharmaceutical industry, the scopes of patents are pretty much
“coextensive” with the drugs sold, creating a scenario aligned with prospect
theory.59 The combined voluminous costs of research and development into
each new drug and the regulatory oversight by the Food and Drug
Administration create a need for strong patent protection that allows for
broad patent claims.60
The patent system also has “policy levers” in place “permit[ing] patent
law to take account of the technology-specific nature of the patent
system.”61 The written description requirement is an example of a policy
lever that has been applied differently for software patents and
biotechnology patents.62 These policy levers enable courts to influence
patent scope.

53. Id. (citation omitted). “Reach-through” provisions appear to give ownership rights of
discoveries made as a result of the licenses to the licensor. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 431.
56. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1595
(2003).
57. Id. at 1625–26.
58. Id. at 1626.
59. Id. at 1617.
60. Id. at 1616.
61. Id. at 1630.
62. Id. at 1653–54.

2011]

Immaterial to Innovation

509

E. ADELMAN’S APPROACH
David Adelman argued that biotechnology patenting has not threatened
biomedical innovation as much as other theorists have predicted.63 Legal
commentators have failed to analyze “the interplay between the underlying
science and patent policy,” and ignored the fact that biotechnology
“research opportunities far exceed the capacities of the scientific
community,” creating “an effectively unbounded, uncongested common
resource.”64 Additionally, the underlying biomedical sciences are more
complex than the media portrays, creating barriers to innovation.65 One of
these barriers results from an attenuated connection between disease
susceptibility and genes.66 This creates the need for “trial-and-error
research” as “identifying useful drug targets and understanding the biology
of diseases [is] challenging.”67 As a result, there are many approaches to
treating diseases; the complexity of human biology diminishes the chance
that a patent anticommons would form.68
F. CONCLUSION
The various economic theories on patent scope and its effect on
innovation provide a much-needed background to a discussion on written
description and enablement. While the scholars who put forth these theories
might have reached different conclusions, they all stressed the importance
of innovation as a goal of the patent system. This goal can be achieved by
using the enablement requirement as a means to invalidate the broadest
patents, and allowing corporations and universities to utilize their varying
strategies to promote research and innovation.69
II. BACKGROUND OF ENABLEMENT AND WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENTS—TWO CHECKS THAT
AFFECT PATENT SCOPE
The exhaustive literature regarding the effect of patent scope on
innovation shows that some checks against broad claims are necessary. The
disclosure requirement checks provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 112 limit “the
exclusionary power conferred by a patent.”70 The statute requires that the
specification . . . contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Adelman, supra note 3, at 986.
Id. at 986–87.
Id. at 1006, 1008.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1014, 1018.
Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 322.
Gay & Spain, supra note 6, at 2.
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pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same . . . .71

Courts have gleaned, in part, two requirements from this statutory
language: “enablement” and “written description.”72 Together they “set
forth what an inventor must give back to the public” in exchange for the
exclusive rights of the patent.73 For enablement, the patentee must include a
specification that “teach[es] those in the art to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation.”74 For written description, “a patent
specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that
one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the
claimed invention.’”75 This section analyses the enablement and written
description requirements with an eye towards critical cases involving
biotechnology patents.
A. ENABLEMENT
The enablement requirement was initially applied in cases involving
biotechnology patents to “police broad claims.”76 Even though the patent
has to include enough information “to enable one of ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention . . . without undue experimentation,” the fact
“[t]hat some experimentation is necessary does not constitute a lack of
enablement.”77 Additionally, a patent need not necessarily disclose all
“embodiments” of the invention.78 In the case In re Wands, the Federal
Circuit considered eight factors in analyzing whether undue
experimentation was necessary to make and use the invention.79 These
factors are:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction
or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples,
(4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art,
and (8) the breadth of the claims.80

Later cases clarified that courts do not need to analyze “all the Wands
factors to find a disclosure enabling.”81

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

35 U.S.C. §112 (2006).
See, e.g., Whitley, supra note 6, at 617.
Huang, supra note 6, at 5.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
76. Huang, supra note 6, at 6.
77. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
78. Huang, supra note 6, at 6.
79. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.
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In Wands, the Federal Circuit held that a patent claiming immunoassay
methods “for the detection of hepatitis B surface antigen [HBsAg] by using
high-affinity monoclonal antibodies of the IgM isotype” was not invalid for
lack of an enabling description.82 This patent disclosed a procedure for
producing sufficient amounts of antibodies by creating hybridomas from
mice lymphocytes.83 These hybridomas secrete both IgG and IgM
antibodies that bind to HBsAg, even though the method only calls for the
IgM isotype.84 However, after analyzing the various hybridoma cell lines
created, the patentees deposited a specific hybridoma cell line that was
found to secrete the IgM antibodies.85 The court decided that undue
experimentation was not needed to acquire the antibodies even though, out
of the 143 high-binding hybridoma cell lines that were created, only four
secreted IgM antibodies that had sufficiently high binding affinity to
HBsAg.86 The patentees analyzed only nine of the hybridomas “beyond the
initial screening for HBsAg binding,” and it is reasonable to conclude that
some of the cell lines not tested produce IgM.87 Additionally, “[t]here was a
high level of skill in the art at the time when the application was filed, and
all of the methods needed to practice the invention were well known.”88
People of ordinary skill in the art know that they need to analyze multiple
cell lines before finding ones that secrete the desired antibody.89
Unlike in Wands, the Federal Circuit in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceuticals Co. found a patent invalid for lack of enablement.90 One
of the patents at issue claimed “all possible DNA sequences that will
encode any polypeptide having an amino acid sequence ‘sufficiently
duplicative’ of EPO to possess the property of increasing production of red
blood cells.”91 The court looked to whether the scope of the specification
was coextensive with the scope of the claim and found that it was not.92
Even though the specification need not disclose all embodiments of the
invention, the patent at issue only disclosed the process of making EPO and
82. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 733, 740.
83. Id. at 734. Hybridomas are created by fusing cancerous myeloma cells with lymphocytes.
Id. The resulting hybrid cell can “divide and grow indefinitely in cell culture.” Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. This cell line “was deposited at the American Type Cultural Collection.” Id. Written
disclosures are sometimes insufficient to enable the public to make and use the invention. Id. at
735. When this is the case, one can comply “with the enablement requirement [by depositing] the
living materials in cell depositories which will distribute samples to the public who wish to
practice the invention after the patent issues.” Id. (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 738, 740.
87. Id. at 739. It is possible to extrapolate that some of the stored cells produce IgM because 4
of the 9 hybridomas tested produce IgM. Id.
88. Id. at 740.
89. Id.
90. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 1203, 1212 (“Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein . . . which stimulates the production
of red blood cells.”).
92. Id. at 1214.
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a few “analogs.”93 The number of potential EPO analogs greatly dwarfed
the ones disclosed.94 Manipulating the nucleotide sequence that codes for
EPO to change just one amino acid in the EPO protein can make “over
3,600 different EPO analogs.”95 Additionally, “over a million different
analogs can be made by substituting three amino acids.”96 Therefore, the
patent did not disclose “enough sequences to justify grant of the claims
sought.”97
Wands and Amgen both provide a framework for how the Federal
Circuit has used the enablement requirement to police broad patent claims.
The Wands patent was upheld because it sufficiently disclosed enough
information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention.98 On the other hand, the broad patent claims in Amgen were
struck down because the possible analogs that fit within the claims
overshadow the few disclosed in the specification.99 Therefore, enablement
serves as a possible check on patent scope.
B. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
The written description requirement was first used by courts to prevent
patentees from amending their applications to include claims not supported
by the written description in their original application, thereby preventing
them from unfairly benefitting from the earlier filing date.100 However, the
Federal Circuit later decided to use the requirement to limit broad claims in
the original application as well.101
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court held that a
patent’s specification did not sufficiently describe the cDNA claimed.102
The broadest claim in the patent claimed “‘[a] recombinant plasmid [that
contained] . . . within its nucleotide sequence a subsequence having the
structure of the reverse transcript of an mRNA of a vertebrate, which
mRNA encodes insulin.’”103 The patent also had separate claims for
“recombinant prokaryotic microorganisms” that contained vertebrate,
mammalian, and human insulin-encoding cDNA.104 Even though the
patentee tried to claim insulin-encoding cDNA contained in recombinant

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Huang, supra note 6, at 7.
See id. at 10 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
102. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1566.
103. Id. at 1563.
104. Id.
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organisms in all species within the vertebrate and mammalian genera, the
specification only disclosed a description of rat-insulin cDNA, and a
method for obtaining the human insulin-encoding cDNA, “along with the
amino acid sequences of human insulin.”105 Holding that “[a]n adequate
written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’” the court found
the claims at issue were not adequately described.106 Though an adequate
description of a genus does not require a description of every species in that
genus, the nucleotide sequence of rat–insulin cDNA is not by itself a
representative sample “of species within the genus.” 107 Additionally, “a
method of preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA
encodes . . . does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.”108
The next important case that ultimately narrowed the holding of Eli
Lilly was Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.109 In Enzo, the patent at
issue claimed “nucleic acid probes that selectively hybridized” to DNA of
N. gonorrhoeae over DNA of N. meningitidis at a ratio greater than five-toone.110 Enzo deposited three nucleic acid probes that “had a selective
hybridization ratio of greater than fifty,” and the patent specifically
referenced these deposited probes.111 In addition, the specification described
“the binding affinity of the claimed nucleotide sequence.”112 However, the
Federal Circuit initially held that a functional description alone is
inadequate to fulfill the written description requirement because “it does not
describe the [nucleic acid] probe itself.”113 Moreover, even though the
deposited sequences might have conveyed possession, “possession alone is
[not] always sufficient to meet that requirement.”114 Burdening the public
by requiring them “to go to a public depository and perform experiments to

105. Id. at 1567.
106. Id. at 1566–67.
107. Id. at 1568–69.
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a
representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the
scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the members of
the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.
Id.

108. Id. at 1567.
109. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I), 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
110. Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1015–16. N. gonorrhoeae is the bacteria that causes gonorrhea. Id. at
1015. The detection of this bacterium has been difficult because nucleic acid probes that bind to it
also generally bind to N. meningitidis, another bacteria. Id.
111. Id. at 1016.
112. Id. at 1017.
113. Id. at 1018.
114. Id. at 1020.
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identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory requirement to
describe one’s invention in the specification.”115
After Enzo petitioned the Federal Circuit for rehearing, the court
decided to “vacate the prior decision, and reverse the district court’s grant
of summary judgment that Enzo’s claims are invalid for failure to meet the
written description requirement.”116 In reaching this conclusion, the court
held “that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository,
which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise
available in written form, constitutes an adequate description of the
deposited material sufficient to comply with the written description
requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.”117 However, since the claims in the patent not
only claimed the deposited nucleic acid probes, but also “subsequences and
mutated variations” of them, the court reversed and remanded to allow a
determination of “whether a person of skill in the art” would understand
that the patentee “possessed” this material based on the description and
“information obtainable from the deposits.”118 Furthermore, the Federal
Circuit concluded that some functional descriptions are adequate for the
written description requirement, and ruled that the lower court should
determine “whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the
claimed sequences are described by their ability to hybridize to structures
that, while not explicitly sequenced, are accessible to the public.”119
The Federal Circuit again analyzed the written description requirement
in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., a case involving a patent
for methods of administering “a non-steroidal compound that selectively
inhibits activity of the [COX-2] gene product to a human host in need of
such treatment.”120 The patent did not disclose any compounds that might
have this effect or even hypothesize how they might be produced or
obtained.121 Furthermore, there was a lack of evidence showing that the
inventors themselves knew of specific compounds that fit the description in
the patent.122 Indeed, the district court even found that the claims at issue

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1021.
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 968.
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917–18 (Fed. Cir. 2004). COX-1
and COX-2 are cyclooxygenases that are involved in various biological pathways in the human
body. Id. at 917. COX-1 plays a role in protecting the stomach lining while “COX-2 is expressed
in response to inflammatory stimuli.” Id. Scientists believe that aspirin, ibuprofen, and other
“[t]raditional non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs” act by inhibiting these cyclooxygenases. Id.
However, since these drugs inhibit both COX-1 and COX-2, they have the unfortunate side effect
of causing stomach problems. Id. at 918. Therefore, University of Rochester scientists tried to
develop a method of only inhibiting COX-2, instead of both enzymes. Id.
121. Id. at 919.
122. Id.
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were not enabling.123 While the Federal Circuit did not consider the
enablement issue on appeal, it did affirm the district court’s finding that the
patent lacked an adequate written description.124 The patent did
not provide any guidance that would steer the skilled practitioner toward
compounds that can be used to carry out the claimed methods—an
essential element of every claim of that patent—and has not provided
evidence that any such compounds were otherwise within the knowledge
of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.125

In essence, the disclosure only laid out a potential research plan for
finding the necessary compounds and a potential function of the compounds
in the event they were found.126 However, in reaching this conclusion, the
court argued that the written description requirement has been recognized
for a long time, in part because past cases invalidated claims that were
broader than the disclosure.127 While this may be true, the Federal Circuit
also invalidated broad claims that were not coextensive with the disclosures
on enablement grounds.128
C. CONFUSION SETS IN
The written description requirement has been confusingly applied over
the years.129 At first, Eli Lilly required a specific accounting of the
invention’s scientific characteristics in order to satisfy the written
description requirement.130 However, Enzo appeared to loosen this
requirement, and held that some functional descriptions might satisfy
written description.131 Additionally, references to a deposit in the
specification are now sufficient.132 Rochester, on the other hand, “took a nodrug, no patent approach.”133 Indeed, “[t]he court’s invention of a separate
written description requirement has ‘create[d] confusion as to where the
public and the courts should look to determine the scope of the patentee’s
right to exclude.’”134 As a result, there had been uncertainty in how patentrelated business should be conducted.135

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 929–30.
Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
Id. at 926–27.
See id. at 923 (citing In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946)).
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Chen, supra note 6, at 572.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 965.
Chen, supra note 6, at 572.
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J.,
concurring) (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
135. Id.

516

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5

III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT
DECISION—ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. ELI

LILLY & COMPANY
Confusion over the written description requirement led the Federal
Circuit to grant en banc review of whether written description is a separate
requirement from enablement.136 This portion of the note will provide an indepth look at Ariad and why the patent at issue is not enabling. The analysis
will demonstrate that enablement—on its own without an independent
written description requirement—is a sufficiently effective check against
the broadest patents. However, since the Federal Circuit held that the
written description is a separate requirement, this note will also analyze the
rehearing opinion and whether it clarifies how to apply the requirement.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The patent at issue in Ariad involves a method for regulating the
activity of the transcription factor NF-KB.137 While NF-KB is an essential
molecule that plays a crucial role in activating genes that help combat
deleterious extracellular influences, it also “can be harmful in excess.”138
Realizing that reducing NF-KB activity might mitigate detrimental disease
symptoms, the inventors filed a patent that claimed a method for “reducing
NF-KB activity.”139 The specification of the patent only disclosed “three
classes of molecules potentially capable of reducing NF-KB activity:
specific inhibitors, dominantly interfering molecules, and decoy
molecules.”140 After the patent was issued on June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs
sued Eli Lilly for infringement, and the jury found the patent enabling with
an adequate written description.141 Eli Lilly appealed.142
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION AND THE CONCURRING OPINION
The majority found that the claims at issue were invalid because the
specification’s written description was inadequate.143 Central to this holding
was the fact that Ariad did not disclose any molecule “capable of reducing
NF-KB activity.”144 Even though Ariad only claimed the method of NF-KB
reduction, the written description requirement is only satisfied with
“adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to
136. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
137. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1369–70. Transcription factors are molecules that regulate the
expression of genes. Id. at 1369.
138. Id. at 1369.
139. Id. at 1370.
140. Id. at 1373.
141. Id. at 1369–70.
142. Id. at 1371.
143. Id. at 1380.
144. Id. at 1373.
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perform the methods.”145 While Ariad did disclose three hypothetical
classes of molecules that might have this desired effect, the overall
specification was insufficient.146 Most of the information concerning the
sole “specific inhibitor” example given was gleaned from a figure not
disclosed until after the effective filing date of the application.147 Therefore,
it could not “offer substantial evidence for the jury determination.”148
Additionally, the rest of the evidence constituted “a vague functional
description and an invitation for further research [which did] not constitute
written disclosure of a specific inhibitor.”149 Moreover, the specification
provided no examples of dominantly interfering molecules.150 Even though
the third class of molecules—“decoy molecules”—was also posed
hypothetically, the specification included examples of their structures via
specific DNA sequences.151 While the court held that this disclosure was an
adequate description of the decoy molecules, it also held that the
specification did not “adequately describ[e the use of] those molecules to
reduce NF-KB activity.”152 It concluded that the disclosure, which merely
stated that NF-KB “would bind the decoy” and lead to “negative
regulation,” did not provide a “descriptive link between the table of decoy
molecules and reducing NF-KB activity.”153 Therefore, in light of the fact
that “[t]he state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain,”
the claims at issue were held invalid, “leaving Ariad with an insufficient
supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its
disclosure.”154
In the concurring opinion, Judge Linn argued that there is no separate
written description requirement.155 This additional requirement, Judge Linn
continued, has had the unfortunate effect of creating confusion and
uncertainty in the law.156 Moreover, the concurrence observed that deciding
the case on written description grounds prevented the court from reviewing
an important enablement issue.157 Ariad broadly claimed “any method for
reducing NF-KB activity in cells, including both known and unknown
methods.”158 Judge Linn mentioned that the court has not “addressed [the
enablement] requirement in relation to the type of claims at issue here—that
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1374–76.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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is, claims written broadly enough to cover any method for achieving a
particular result.”159 Judge Linn concluded that these broad claims might be
per se invalid because “the specification cannot enable unknown
methods.”160
C. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE ON ENABLEMENT
GROUNDS
Judge Linn made a valid point when arguing that Ariad’s broad method
claims might be invalid for lack of enablement. Past Federal Circuit
precedent clearly shows that the court has held similarly broad claims
invalid for failing to enable. Because narrower claims have been struck
down on enablement grounds and broad method claims are problematic,161
the facts of Ariad suggest that the enablement requirement can serve as an
effective check against the broadest patents. Moreover, if the written
description requirement still serves a purpose, it is to limit claims that might
happen to survive an enablement analysis. The Federal Circuit has made a
habit of deciding cases on written description grounds without reaching an
enablement analysis.162 Therefore, the Federal Circuit should not even reach
an analysis of a patent’s written description until it decides whether a patent
is enabling. However, even in the recent rehearing decision, the Federal
Circuit failed to conduct an enablement analysis of the Ariad patent.163
The Ariad patent does not include enough information “to enable one of
ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention . . . without undue
experimentation.”164 While the patent in Amgen was struck down even
though it sufficiently disclosed some embodiments of the invention,165 the
patent in Ariad did not sufficiently disclose any embodiments of the
claimed invention.166 Undue experimentation would be needed to find a
way to make and use the invention because, of the three hypothetical
classes of molecules posed, no molecules were disclosed as of the effective
date of filing for two of the classes, and the method to use molecules of the
third class was vague at best.167 Unlike the material in Wands,168 no
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929–30 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“In view of our affirmance of the district court’s decision on the written description ground, we
consider the enablement issue to be moot and will not discuss it further.”); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Whether or not it provides an
enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin
. . . .”).
163. See discussion infra Part III.D.
164. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
165. Id. at 1213–14.
166. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1376.
167. Id. at 1374–76.
168. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 734–35 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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molecules were deposited in Ariad. Lastly, the Federal Circuit in Ariad held
that the “art at the time of filing” was nascent and untested,169 unlike the
state of the art in Wands. In the latter case, the court held that the skill in the
art as of the filing date was high enough so that the techniques required to
utilize the invention were recognized in the field.170 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit would also likely hold the claims at issue in Ariad invalid for lack of
enablement. As a result, the enablement requirement as it stands now serves
as an effective control measure for these broadest patents.
D. THE REHEARING DECISION
Even though the Federal Circuit decided to rehear Ariad, and even
though enablement serves as an effective check against broad patents, the
Federal Circuit ultimately decided that the written description is indeed a
separate requirement.171 Relying, in part, on statutory interpretation, the
court argued that “[i]f Congress had intended enablement to be the sole
description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, the statute would have
been written differently.”172 After it agreed that written description is a
separate requirement, the court looked to how it should be applied. The
court affirmed that the description in the specification “must ‘clearly allow
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented
what is claimed.’”173 To satisfy this test, courts should determine “whether
the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those
skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject
matter as of the filing date.”174
However, the court admitted that “[t]he term ‘possession’ . . . has never
been very enlightening.”175 In an attempt to clarify how “possession” should
be interpreted, the court specified that the purpose of the written description
requirement is disclosure.176 Therefore, the standard “requires an objective
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a
person of ordinary skill in the art.”177 This inquiry into possession is a
question of fact, and so may vary depending on the facts of each case.178 As
a result, the court declined “to predict and adjudicate all the factual
scenarios to which the written description requirement could be applied.”179
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1376.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 740.
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d. 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1351 (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It also refused to provide any bright line rules.180 Instead, it set out certain
principles that have been applied in the past; for instance, the court
reiterated that “a [mere] constructive reduction to practice that in a definite
way identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written description
requirement.”181 Moreover, actual “possession” alone is insufficient because
possession must be demonstrated by the specification.182 And, while the
court admitted that “written description and enablement often rise and fall
together,” it also argued that the written description requirement is needed
for instances when claims cannot be described because they cannot be
invented, but “do not require undue experimentation to make and use.”183
Lastly, the court recited its precedent when describing how to apply the
written description requirement.184
With this decision, it has been argued that the Federal Circuit did not
provide much direction in how the written description requirement should
be applied.185 Indeed, for the most part, it simply rehashed prior precedent
without clarification. The decision, therefore, is likely to have less of an
impact186 on the patent landscape than many had hoped or thought,
especially as the court explicitly acknowledged that the written description
and enablement requirements are generally either both met or not met
together. Therefore universities and companies will, for the most part, draft
successful patents even if they only follow enablement alone. However,
their licensing and litigation strategies should help them adapt to the now
concrete written description requirement as well.
IV. UNIVERSITY AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES THAT LIMIT
PATENT EFFECTS ON INNOVATION
The fact that broad patents like the one in Ariad could be kept in check
with the enablement requirement—and that universities and companies
have developed strategies that effectively permit their continued
research187—highlights the point that a heightened written description
requirement is not a necessary control mechanism for innovation. However,
even with this requirement, the strategies will prevent innovation from

180. Id.
181. Id. at 1352 (citing Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357. 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1353.
185. Skaist, supra note 14.
186. Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of
Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 60, 61, available
at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/collins.ariad.pdf.
187. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 322.
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being stymied.188 This section of the note analyzes some of these strategies
and shows that many of the concerns over patents’ effect on innovation
have not come to pass.189 Additionally, it will present examples of how
these approaches attempt to resolve potential problems created by both
broad and narrow patents. Lastly, the section will conclude with a
suggestion for the best method of maintaining innovation in biomedical
research.
A recent study analyzed corporate and university strategies that have
been used to limit the impediment of biomedical innovation by conducting
“interviews with personnel at biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms and
universities in considering the effects of research tool patents on industrial
or academic biomedical research.”190 Research tools in this context “include
any tangible or informational input into the process of discovering a drug or
any other medical therapy or method of diagnosing disease.”191 The patent
at issue in Ariad is an example of a research tool patent because it is for
potential molecules “capable of reducing NF-KB activity.”192 The goal of
reducing this transcription factor was to mitigate symptoms of diseases.193
Therefore, the patent at issue in Ariad and others are relevant to this
discussion.
Two situations may occur in the biomedical field that could impede
innovation. First, an anticommons may form in the biomedical field.194 As
described earlier,195 an anticommons forms when there are “multiple patents
covering different components of some product, its method of manufacture,
or inputs into the process through which it is discovered.”196 However,
biomedical research efforts may also be prevented and innovation impeded
when there are instead relatively few patents on “key tool[s] or
discover[ies].”197 When these broad patents are not shared, they “may limit
the use of these discoveries in subsequent discovery and consequently limit
the pace of innovation.”198 The Ariad patent is such a broad patent because
it potentially includes all molecules that are capable of lowering NF-KB
activity.199 However, even though Ariad is an example of a potentially
188. Id. at 322–23 (asserting that many companies liberally and broadly license their patents in
the belief that “by giving several firms a nonexclusive license they increase the chances that one
will discover a useful drug”).
189. Id. at 324.
190. Id. at 287. The authors of this study conducted seventy interviews with various employees
at firms and universities to determine the effect of patents on innovation. Id.
191. Id.
192. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
193. Id. at 1370.
194. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 293–96.
195. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
196. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 293.
197. Id. at 305.
198. Id. at 288.
199. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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problematic patent, there is evidence that innovation has not been stymied
by the formation of an anticommons.
There has been little to no evidence that an anticommons has formed.200
While the amount of biotechnology patents increased rapidly from 1985 to
2000, and with it the number of licenses needed for individual projects—
creating an ever-increasing complexity in the patent landscape—many
researchers believe that the costs are manageable and worth the potential for
“downstream discoveries.”201 First, there has been almost no “breakdown in
negotiations over rights that lead to an R&D project’s cessation.”202 The
majority of the time researchers were able to obtain the necessary patent
rights for their projects through licensing.203 Second, even though hundreds
of patents are typically considered for a biomedical project initially,
relatively few—if any—of those will end up needing to be licensed.204
While the resulting licensing fees might still be high, they usually result in a
loss for research projects, and the potential for high royalty fees rarely stops
such projects from continuing.205 The costs are considered to “be within
reason largely because the productivity gains conferred by the licensed
research tools were thought to be worth the price.”206 Additionally, these
costs are often discounted for government and university researchers.207
Therefore, while several narrow patents that cover a field may lead to
higher licensing costs, innovation does not appear unreasonably impeded.
Moreover, there does not seem to be an unchecked problem with
exclusive licensing and broad patents.208 The concern, discussed earlier, “is
that restrictive assertion or licensing of patents on research tools—
especially foundational upstream discoveries upon which subsequent
research must build . . . may undermine the advance of biomedical
research.”209 These research tools were originally placed in the public
200. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 297–305.
201. Id. at 293, 301. 2,000 biotechnology patents were issued in 1985, while over 13,000 have
been issued in 2000. Id. at 293.
202. Id. at 298.
203. Id. (“Of the 55 respondents who addressed this issue . . . , 54 could not point to a specific
project stopped because of difficulties in getting agreement from multiple IP owners.”).
204. Id. at 294.
[Respondents] said that there may be a large number of patents to consider initially—
sometimes in the hundreds, and that this number is surely larger than in the past.
However, respondents then went on to say that in practice there may be, in a
complicated case, about 6-12 that they have to seriously address, but that more typically
the number was zero.
Id.

205. Id. at 299–300.
206. Id. at 301.
207. Id. at 302 (“Celera, for example, licenses their databases to firms for about $5 million to
$15 million per year and to university labs for about $7,500 to $15,000.”).
208. Id. at 322–23.
209. Id. at 296.
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domain, but they recently have been patented more and more.210 However,
while there are examples of cases where broadly interpreted patents on
targets “prevent[ed] others from engaging in the subsequent development
needed to bring the patented technology to market,” it appears to make
economic sense to broadly license these patents.211 If these broad patents on
targets are “exploited on an exclusive basis,” a social cost results that may
be detrimental to firms.212 For example, various pharmaceutical firms have
“libraries” of drugs that might affect the patented targets.213 These libraries
are highly differentiated across the firms, so the odds of finding an ideal
drug for the target increase with the availability of the license.214 However,
the capabilities of the firms obviously depend on their size, and the
strategies vary.215 Additionally, firms still complain about the patentees’
exclusive use of research tools—especially of “‘targets,’ which refers to any
cell receptor, enzyme, or other protein implicated in a disease, thus
representing a promising locus for drug intervention.”216 Notwithstanding
the concerns regarding broad patents on research tools, “the problem was
generally considered to be manageable” because “of private strategies and
institutional responses that limited the adverse effects of the changing IP
landscape.”217
Two reasons innovation has not been unreasonably impeded in the
biomedical field are the strategies developed by firms and universities and
their ability to adapt. For one thing, it is relatively easy to contract and
license out patents.218 Many companies have also decided to license targets
liberally and broadly because it enhances the probability of discovering
useful drugs.219 However, when licensing is not the optimal strategy,
universities and firms can also “invent around” patents, ignore patents,
create public databases, or challenge patents in court.220 Therefore, even
with the written description requirement now firmly in place, universities
and firms already have a portfolio of strategies to adapt and the ability to
develop more.
Firms and universities usually have the ability to “invent around”
patents.221 This is even true in the face of broad patents on targets because,
even in those cases, it is unlikely that they would “confer exclusive rights to
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 307–11.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 311.
See id.
Id. (“[M]uch of the university licensing of biomedical innovations to small firms is on an
exclusive basis.”).
216. Id. at 310.
217. Id. at 322.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 323.
220. Id. at 323–24.
221. Id. at 323.
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working on a disease.”222 Many diseases—including cancer, AIDS, and
heart disease—are very complex and multiple proteins, multiple receptors,
and multiple drugs might work and need to be tested.223 The Ariad patent,
while overly broad, was only for molecules that inhibit NF-KB. There are
likely other transcription factors that are involved in the expression of
disease symptoms. Therefore, even the Ariad patent would have been
unlikely to confer exclusive rights. Moreover, the enablement requirement
is perfectly capable of limiting similarly broad patents without the written
description requirement.
If inventing around patents is not successful, another option is to ignore
patents on upstream inventions and soldier on with the research without
them.224 It is particularly hard to ascertain whether research tool patents are
being infringed, so many firms and universities try their hand at remaining
under the radar.225 Researchers, especially those at universities, “have a
reputation for routinely ignoring IP rights in the course of their research.”226
However, they are usually shielded from lawsuits because many firms do
not want to enforce their patents against them.227 Damages are likely to be
comparatively low and the probability of resultant bad publicity high.228
Additionally, many firms want to develop and maintain friendly
relationships with universities to promote the sharing of information.229 To
encourage this trusting environment, firms sometimes give out research
tools to universities for free.230 These universities, as a rule, also “do not
assert their rights against one another.”231 The fact that firms do not
typically enforce their rights against universities and sometimes “feel that it
is not worth their while to assert their patents on all other firms that might
be infringing,”232 shows that they might be taking strategic risks. “[In most
instances] the cost of pursuing these cases greatly outweighs their value.”233
Therefore, firms will now more likely tend to avoid lawsuits to prevent their
patents from being held invalid for failure to have adequate written
descriptions.
The complex strategies utilized by universities and corporations, as
shown, are more than enough to overcome the potentially additional burden
of the written description requirement, especially since they already had to

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 324.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 328.
Id.
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adapt to this requirement in the past. Now that the written description
requirement has been more firmly embedded into patent law, it will serve as
merely one factor in an analysis of whether to use licensing or litigation as
protective measures. Indeed, “[m]aximising the value of patents requires
careful planning and continual diligence.”234 In order for universities and
firms to effectively manage their patents, they need to carefully assess “the
costs, risks and rewards of licensing and litigation options.”235 Some patents
may not be worth litigation expenses, while others may not be right for
licensing purposes.236
Licensing might be the best strategy for patent owners because it is
“generally less expensive then pursuing litigation” and “can also lead to
significant market expansion and generate new sources of revenue for the
patent owner through the business relationship.”237 Licensing is more
predictable, and since it is cooperative in nature, it might enhance a
business’ reputation more so than litigation.238 However, as licensing is, in a
sense, a compromise, “the patent holder must cede some value of the
patented technology to the licensee.”239 This is why litigation might
occasionally prove a better strategy to enforce one’s patent rights. With
litigation, a patent holder “seeks to maintain exclusive control, avoiding the
risks of lost commercial exploitation or tarnishment of the property.”240 On
the other hand, the significant costs and uncertainty make litigation a
weaker strategy in many situations.241 Indeed, litigation could cost up to ten
million dollars.242 Corporations and universities should rely on the Ariad
rehearing when deciding on what strategy to utilize.
CONCLUSION
This note has discussed why innovation will be unaffected by the
Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold the written description requirement.
Corporations and universities already have several strategies in place to
prevent innovation from being impeded, and these strategies help limit the
fallout from anticommons formations, broad patents, and exclusive
licensing.243 Furthermore, the enablement requirement already serves as an
effective check on the broadest and most unfair patents, like the one in
234. Bruce C. Haas & Christopher V. Beckman, United States Patent Enforcement: Licensing
and Litigation Considerations, BUILDING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUE 68,
68 (2008), available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/08_USA/68-71fitzpatrick.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 69.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 70.
241. Id. at 70–71.
242. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 315.
243. Id. at 322, 331.
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Ariad. Therefore, the written description requirement will not have a
significant impact on how universities and firms do business. If anything, it
will only serve as one factor in an analysis of what strategies to utilize.
Brian Kimmelblatt
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